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TORTS - JUDICIAL IMMUNITY: A SWORD FOR THE MALICIOUS OR A SHIELD FOR THE CONSCIENTIOUS? STUMP v.
SPARKMAN, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Stump v. Sparkman,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a state judge, who had approved an ex parte petition of a
mother seeking to have her daughter sterilized, was immune from
damages liability when sued by the daughter under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.2 In reaffirming the century-old doctrine of judicial immunity
pronounced in Bradley v. Fisher,3 the Supreme Court held that a
judge 4 remains absolutely immune from civil liability for his judicial
acts. 5 The Court noted that judicial immunity attaches even when a
judge's actions are taken in error, done maliciously, in excess of his
6 or are "flawed by the commission
authority,
of grave procedural
7
errors."
The Court declared that the only exceptions to judicial immunity
are when a judge's actions are nonjudicial in character 8 or when a
judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. 9 Finding Judge
Stump's act to be a judicial one, and also finding that he had
jurisdiction to consider and approve the sterilization petition, the
Court held his actions to be immune from suit.10 While acknowledging the "tragic consequences"" of the judge's actions, the Court
reasoned that the need for judges to decide controversial cases
1. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
3. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). See text accompanying notes 43-48 infra.
4. Subsequent to Stump, the Supreme Court extended absolute judicial immunity to
federal hearing examiners and administrative law judges in Butz v. Economou,
98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978).
5. Under some circumstances, a judge may be subject to criminal liability for his
actions. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (dictum); Ex parteVirginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1880); Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1945). The
courts have split on the question of whether judicial immunity bars suits against
judges for injunctive or equitable, as opposed to monetary, relief. Compare
Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975) with Mirin v. Justices of
Supreme Court of Nevada, 415 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Nev. 1976). See also Annot., 64
A.L.R.3d 1251 (1975).
6. 98 S.Ct. at 1105.
7. Id. at 1106.
8. Id. Accord, Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) ("A judge does not
cease to be a judge when he undertakes to chair a PTA meeting, but, of course, he
does not bring judicial immunity to that forum, either.").
9. 98 S.Ct. at 1105.
10. Id. at 1108-09.
11. See id. at 1108.
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without fear of suit by disgruntled litigants mandated the retention
12
of absolute judicial immunity.
On July 9, 1971, Ora Spitler McFarlin, the mother of Linda
Spitler, presented a petition to Judge Harold Stump of the Circuit
Court of DeKalb County, Indiana. 13 The petition was entitled
"Petition To Have Tubal Ligation Performed On Minor And
Indemnity Agreement. 1 4 It contained an affidavit by Mrs. McFarlin
stating that Linda was fifteen years-old and was "somewhat
retarded," although she was attending public school and had been
promoted each year to the next grade with her class. Mrs. McFarlin
also alleged that Linda had spent the night on several occasions
with older youths and young men. Unable to maintain "continuous
observation" over her daughter's activities, Mrs. McFarlin asserted
that it would be in Linda's best interests to be sterilized in order to
"prevent unfortunate circumstances" from occurring.
Judge Stump approved the sterilization petition that same day
in an ex parte proceeding. No notice was given to Linda either prior
to or after the proceeding. No guardian ad litem was appointed to
represent her interests. No hearing was held. The petition was not
given a docket number nor was it or Judge Stump's subsequent
approval ever filed in the DeKalb County Circuit Court,15 thereby
precluding the possibility of appeal.
On July 15, 1971, Linda Spitler was taken to the DeKalb
Memorial Hospital. She was not informed of the true purpose for her
entry; rather, she was told that the purpose of the hospital stay was
to have her appendix removed. A successful tubal ligation was
subsequently performed on Linda, thereby sterilizing
her. She left
16
the hospital without discovering the subterfuge.
In 1973, Linda married Leo Sparkman. Two years later, after
being unable to become pregnant, Linda learned from the doctor who
performed the tubal ligation that she had been sterilized during the
1971 operation.1 7 The Sparkmans filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against Judge
Stump, Mrs. McFarlin, the attorney who prepared the sterilization
petition, the doctors involved in the sterilization operation, and the
DeKalb Memorial Hospital.' 8 The Sparkmans sought damages under

12. Id. Judicial immunity has even been extended to West Publishing Company for
publishing an allegedly defamatory, judicial opinion. Lowenschuss v. West
Publishing Co., 542 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1976), noted in 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1103 (1977);
see also Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 825 (1955).
13. 98 S. Ct. at 1101.
14. Id. at 1102 n.1. The entire petition is set out in the Appendix.
15. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 173 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Stump v.
Sparkman, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978).
16. 98 S.Ct. at 1103.
17. 552 F.2d at 173.
18. 98 S.Ct. at 1103.
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20 for the alleged depriva42 U.S.C. § 198319 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
21
rights.
tions of Linda's constitutional
The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the
federal claims. 22 In so doing, the court first determined that a
showing of state action was required to support the Sparkmans'
constitutional claims and that the only state action 23 present was
the approval of the sterilization petition by Judge Stump. The court
declared that the judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity,
reasoning that Judge Stump had jurisdiction to consider and
approve the petition. 24 The district court then dismissed the federal
claims against all the defendants since Judge Stump, the only state
25

actor, was immune from suit.

19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 2 supra.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). Section 1985(3) provides, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons. .. conspire or go in disguise on the highway or
on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving. . . any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws and in any case of conspiracy
set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do ...
any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another
is injured ...
or deprived of ... any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have a cause of
action for damages against the conspirators.
While § 1983 requires a showing of state action, § 1985(3) reaches purely private
conspiracies. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
21. The Sparkmans alleged, inter alia, that the defendants violated Linda's
fourteenth amendment due process rights as well as her right to privacy and to
procreate. 98 S. Ct. at 1103 n.2. See also Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.
1975) (claim that defendants deprived plaintiff of her ability to bear children by
performing sterilization alleged the denial of a civil right under § 1983). The
Sparkmans also alleged pendent state claims for assault and battery, medical
malpractice, and for Leo Sparkman's loss of potential fatherhood. 98 S. Ct. at
1103.
22. 98 S. Ct. at 1103. The district court's opinion was unreported. Sparkman v.
McFarlin, Civil No. F75-129 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 1976).
23. Cf. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) (private hospital held to be a
state actor in a § 1983 suit by a deaf mute mother who was involuntarily
sterilized in the hospital); Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 1266 (1978) (physician who required indigent patients who were
having a third child to voluntarily submit to sterilization following delivery of
the child or seek another physician held not to be a state actor in a § 1983 suit by
a former patient who submitted to sterilization); Harley v. Oliver, 539 F.2d 1143
(8th Cir. 1976) (actions of attorney in performance of his duties as counsel
representing divorced father of child upon whom mother wanted surgery
performed without use of blood transfusions were not performed under color of
state law; attorney held not liable under § 1983). See also Note, JudicialReview of
Private Hospital Activities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 445, 450-64 (1976).
24. 552 F.2d at 174.
25. The district court also dismissed the pendent state claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court noted in a footnote that the issue was not
before the Court of whether the district court should have dismissed the federal
claims against the other defendants upon a finding that the only state actor, the
judge, was immune. 98 S. Ct. at 1109 n.9. The Court cited two cases which
discussed the same issue and reached contrary results. Compare Kermit Constr.
Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) with Guedry
v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970). When dealing with judicial immunity,
federal courts have held that a private person alleged to have conspired with a
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed. 26 It found that Judge Stump did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the sterilization petition as it determined that
27
neither statutory nor common law granted him such jurisdiction. It
maintained that "[t]here are actions of purported judicial character
that a judge, even when exercising general jurisdiction, is not
empowered to take. '28 The court of appeals also charged Judge
Stump with a "failure to comply with elementary principles of
procedural due process. ' 29 The court concluded, for these two
reasons, that Judge Stump was not entitled to judicial immunity in
approving the sterilization petition and therefore was subject to suit
under section 1983.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 3° and
reversed the judgment31 of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a
five-to-three decision.
II. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Stump v. Sparkman32 is only the fourth case in which the
Supreme Court has dealt with the question of judicial immunity from
civil suits 33 and the first Supreme Court case in over a hundred years
which has dealt solely with judicial immunity. 34 The doctrine of
judge who is entitled to immunity cannot be held liable under § 1983 or § 1985(3).
E.g., Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975); Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40
F.R.D. 500 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
26. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Stump v.
Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
27. 552 F.2d at 174-76.
28. Id. at 176.
29. Id.
30. 434 U.S. 815 (1977).
31. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978). In the majority were the Chief Justice
and Justices White (author of the opinion), Rehnquist, Blackmun and Stevens.
Justice Stewart authored a dissent in which Justices Marshall and Powell joined.
Justice Powell wrote a separate dissent. Justice Brennan did not participate in
the consideration or decision of the case. The apparent swing vote of this case
was that of Justice Stevens. Had he voted with the dissenters, the vote would
have been a four-to-four tie which would have resulted in an affirmance of the
Seventh Circuit's decision. In light of some of Justice Stevens's sensitive and
pragmatic opinions which have shown great concern for the rights of criminal
defendants, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414-15 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Lakeside v. Oregon, 98 S. Ct. 1041, 1096-99 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), his position and silence on this case is puzzling. It merits noting that
prior to Justice Stevens's appointment to the Supreme Court in 1975, he served
on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the very court whose decision in this
case he joined in reversing.
32. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
33. The other three cases were Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967). A fifth case involving judicial immunity, Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894
(1978), was decided two months after the Stump decision. See note 4 supra.
34. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) dealt mainly with the question of liability of
police officers under § 1983. The Court's discussion of judicial immunity was only
little more than a page in length. Id. at 553-55.
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judicial immunity in this country has its origins in England3 5 and
has been rooted completely in common law. 36 Under the English
rule, judges of superior courts have been held absolutely immune
from liability for their judicial acts while magistrates and justices of

37
the peace have been held liable for judicial acts taken maliciously.

Prior to the first Supreme Court case on the subject, state courts in
the United States were less than uniform in their treatment of
judicial immunity. Some courts adopted the absolute immunity rule

38
while others granted judges only a qualified immunity from suit.
In 1868, the Supreme Court addressed the question of judicial

immunity for the first time in Randall v. Brigham.39 The Court held

that judges of general jurisdiction were not liable in civil actions for
their judicial acts "unless perhaps where the acts, in excess of

jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly." 4 The Court relied on
English and American precedent, reasoning:

This doctrine is as old as the law, and its maintenance is
essential to the impartial administration of justice. Any
other doctrine would necessarily lead to the degradation of

the judicial authority and the destruction of its usefulness.
Unless judges, in administering justice, are uninfluenced by

considerations personal to themselves, they can afford little
protection to the citizen in his person or property....
This exemption from civil action is for the sake of the
public, and not merely for the protection of the judge. And it
35. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE I.J. 322, 325
(1969). The first recorded case on judicial immunity seems to be Floyd & Barker,
77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1608). For a discussion of the status of judicial
immunity in England today, see generally Brazier, Judicial Immunity and the
Independence of the Judiciary, 1976 PUBLIC LAw 397; Thompson, Judicial
Immunity And The Protection of Justices, 21 MODERN L REV. 517 (1958). The
doctrine of judicial immunity in England developed as a corollary to the theory:
' The King can do no wrong."; that judges, as the King's personal representatives, should answer to him alone. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536
(1868).
36. This has prompted one legal commentator to remark that "judges, as the ones
administering tort liability, have at least had no reason for being unfriendly
toward their own immunity." Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative
Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 272 (1937). For other policy reasons for Judicial
immunity, see id. at 271-72. Judicial immunity is not constitutionally mandated.
See note 141 infra.
37. Note, Immunity Of Federal And State Judges From Civil Suit - Time For A
Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 732 n.28 (1977); Note,
Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 325 (1969).
38.
By 1871, thirteen states had adopted the absolute immunity rule; six
states had ruled that judges were liable if they acted maliciously; in nine
states, courts had faced the issue but had not ruled clearly one way or
the other, and nine states had apparently not yet faced the issue.
Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 326- 27
(1969) (footnotes omitted).
39. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). Randallinvolved a civil suit for wrongful removal by
an attorney against a state judge who disbarred him after the attorney was
found guilty of malpractice and misconduct.
40. Id. at 536. Judges of courts of limited jurisdiction were held to be entitled to the
same immunity only when they acted within their jurisdiction. Id. at 535-36.
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has been maintained by a uniform course of decisions in
centuries, and in this country ever since its
England for
41
settlement.
The Court concluded that the proper remedy for redress of an
by a judge protected by immunity was
oppressive or arbitrary act
42
impeachment from office.
In 1872, the Supreme Court, in Bradley v. Fisher,43 significantly
enlarged the doctrine of judicial immunity, holding that judges of
courts of general jurisdiction "are not liable to civil actions for their
judicial acts even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction,
and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. '44 While
reaffirming the Randall rationale for judicial immunity, the Bradley
Court overruled the qualifying language of Randall. Justice Field,
author of both opinions, explained in Bradley: "[T]he qualifying
words used [in the Randall opinion] were not necessary to a correct
statement of the law."' 45 The reasons given by Justice Field for the
exclusion of the qualifying language were the difficulty that a judge
of general jurisdiction had in determining the extent of his
jurisdiction 46 and the ease with which a plaintiff might allege
malicious or corrupt motives on the ' 47part of a judge, thereby
subjecting him to "vexatious litigation.

The Court drew a distinction between a judge acting in excess of
his jurisdiction and a judge acting in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. 48 A judge acting in excess of his jurisdiction retained his
41. Id. at 536. The Court's statement that American decisions on the question of
42.
43.

44.
45.

46.
47.
48.

judicial immunity were uniform would seem to be in error upon an examination
of earlier American decisions. See note 38 supra.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 537.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). Like Randall, Bradley involved a suit by an
attorney against a judge who disbarred him. The attorney had represented John
H. Suratt in his trial before the judge for the murder of President Abraham
Lincoln.
Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
Id. In further ambiguous language, Justice Field wrote:
The qualifying words [in the Randall opinion] were inserted upon the
suggestion that the previous language laid down the doctrine of judicial
exemption from liability to civil actions in terms broader than was
necessary for the case under consideration, and that if the language
remained unqualified it would require an explanation of some apparently conflicting adjudications found in the reports. They were not
intended as an expression of opinion that in the cases supposed such
liability would exist, but to avoid the expression of a contrary doctrine.
Id.
See id. at 352-53.
See id. at 354. Justices Davis and Clifford dissented in Bradley, contending that
judges who act in excess of their jurisdiction, acting maliciously and corruptly,
should be subject to private suits. Id. at 357 (Davis and Clifford, JJ., dissenting).
The Court distinguished excess of jurisdiction from the clear absence of all
jurisdiction over the subject matter as follows:
A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and
the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there
is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised
is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the
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immunity while a judge acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction
forfeited his immunity. As a result of Bradley, judges were
absolutely immune from civil suit except where (1) their actions were
nonjudicial in character; or (2) their actions were taken in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.
While Bradley was being argued before the Supreme Court,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 49 the forerunner of
section 1983. 50 Section 1983 would seem to provide a statutory, civil
cause of action for judicial wrongdoing as, in its present form, it
applies to "every person. 5 1 Federal courts, however, did not have
occasion to address the question of whether the doctrine of judicial
immunity was overruled by this congressional mandate until 1945 in
Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.5 2 There the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned that the conclusion was "irresistible"5 3 that the
doctrine of judicial immunity was abrogated by the Civil Rights Act
and that judges were subject to suit thereunder. Though some courts
initially followed Picking,54 others5 5 later repudiated it after the
want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But
where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge,
or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the
jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his

determination as any other questions involved in the case, although

49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.

upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the
validity of his judgments may depend. Thus, if a probate court, invested
only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates of deceased
persons, should proceed to try parties for public offences, jurisdiction
over the subject of offences being entirely wanted in the court, and this
being necessarily known to its judge, his commission would afford no
protection to him in the exercise of the usurped authority. But if on the
other hand a judge of a criminal court, invested with general criminal
jurisdiction over offences committed within a certain district, should
hold a particular act to be a public offence, which is not by the law made
an offence, and proceed to the arrest and trial of a party charged with
such act, or should sentence a party convicted to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the law upon its proper construction, no
personal liability to civil action for such acts would attach to the judge,
although those acts would be in excess of his jurisdiction, or of the
jurisdiction of the court held by him, for these are particulars for his
judicial consideration, whenever his general jurisdiction over the subjectmatter is invoked.
Id. at 351-52.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Id. (emphasis added). The wording of the 1871 Act, which applied to "any
person," was changed for apparent aesthetic purposes by the person who
prepared the Revised Statutes of 1878. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under
Section 1983, 79 YALE LJ. 322, 325 n.19 (1969).
151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947).
151 F.2d at 250.
See, e.g., Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948); Alesna v. Rice, 74 F.
Supp. 865 (D. Haw. 1947).
See, e.g., Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021
(1967); Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kenney v.
Killian, 352 U.S. 855 (1956) where the courts reasoned by analogy to Tenney that
Congress did not intend to abrogate the doctrine of judicial immunity.
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Supreme Court decision in Tenney v. Brandhove,56 which held that,
in the absence of congressional intent to the contrary, legislators
acting in their official capacities were immune from suits under the
Civil Rights Act.
The Supreme Court did not confront the issue of whether state
judges were liable to civil suits under section 1983 until 1967 in
Pierson v. Ray.5 7 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority,
held state court judges to be immune from section 1983 suits. The
Court reaffirmed Bradley and concluded, without elaboration, that
"few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than
the immunity of judges from liability for damages committed within
their judicial jurisdiction. 5 8 Moreover, the Court found that "[t]he
legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to
abolish wholesale all common-law immunities" 59 when it enacted the
Civil Rights Act, and since the doctrine of judicial immunity was so
"well established ...

Congress would have specifically so provided

had it wished to abolish the doctrine." °
Justice Douglas vigorously dissented in Pierson,finding that the
import of the wording of section 1983 was clear: "To most, 'every
61
person' would mean every person, not every person except judges."
He also examined the legislative record of the Civil Rights Act and
determined that every Congressman who spoke on the question
assumed that the Act would apply to state judges. 62 Nowhere was

56. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). Referring to the long-standing, constitutional tradition of

57.

58.

59.
60.

61.
62.

legislative immunity, the Court declared: "We cannot believe that Congress itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom - would impinge on a tradition
so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general
language before us." Id. at 376.
386 U.S. 547 (1967). Piersoninvolved a § 1983 suit by black and white clergymen
who were arrested and convicted for violating a state breach of the peace statute
by attempting to use a segregated, bus terminal waiting room in Jackson,
Mississippi. Named as defendants were the police officers who arrested them and
the police justice who convicted them.
Id. at 553-54. One legal commentator has suggested that the reason for the
Pierson holding was the Court's desire to prevent harassment of state judges
through the increasingly popular § 1983 damages suit. Kates, Immunity Of State
Judges Under The Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65
Nw. U.L. REv. 615, 617-19 (1970).
386 U.S. at 554.
Id. at 554-55. But cf. United States v. LePatourel, 571 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1978).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a federal judge's nonjudicial
conduct (driving automobile while on official business) comes within the purview
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976). The court
reasoned "that the failure to exclude specifically the judiciary in the final version
of the Act reflected a conscious congressional choice." 571 F.2d at 409.
386 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 561-62. Justice Douglas quoted from the remarks of Congressman Arthur
of Kentucky who opposed the statute:
Under the provisions of this section every judge in the State court ...
will enter upon and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of
Damocles suspended over him by a silken thread, and bent upon him the
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this assumption contradicted.6 3 Justice Douglas also argued that
absolute immunity was not needed to maintain an independent
judiciary and that the fear of a flood of suits which would harass the
64
judiciary was only conjecture.
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court initiated its analysis in Stump v. Sparkman 65 with a reaffirmance of the doctrine of judicial immunity as
pronounced in Bradley and reinforced in Pierson. The Court's
opinion was based on an examination of three questions: (1) whether
Judge Stump had subject matter jurisdiction over the sterilization
petition; (2) whether Judge Stump's failure, as the court of appeals
framed it, "to comply with elementary principles of procedural due
process"6 6 stripped the judge of his immunity; and (3) whether Judge
Stump's act constituted a judicial act. Justice Stewart focused his
strongly worded dissent6 7 on the third question. Justice Powell

63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

scowl of unbridled power, the forerunner of the impending wrath, which
is gathering itself to burst upon its victim.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1871). But see Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d
581, 587-88 n.8 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
This legislative history was recounted to the Supreme Court in Stump in the
Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union at 41-51, obviously to
no avail. See generally Note, Immunity Of FederalAnd State Judges From Civil
Suit - Time For A Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 727, 738-40
(1977); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE lJ.322,
327-28 (1969). One legal commentator has argued that in view of the legislative
record, "the proposition that § 1983 leaves the common law of judicial immunity
intact (while the statute upon which it was consciously modeled abrogates it)
approaches the incredible. If the test is one of congressional purpose (as it surely
is), no absolute immunity for state judges can be read into § 1983." Kates,
Immunity Of State Judges Under The Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 615, 622-23 (1970) (footnotes omitted). Moreover,
at the time of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1871, Randall v. Brigham,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868) (holding judges liable when acting in excess of their
authority and maliciously or corruptly) was still good law. To suggest, therefore,
that the congressional intent was to maintain absolute judicial immunity flies in
the face of the record and the time period.
386 U.S. at 564-67.
98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978).
552 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1977).
Justice Stewart took the unusual step of reading his dissent from the bench when
the opinion was handed down. The following excerpt from a Washington Post
report gives an indication that emotions ran high among the Justices over the
case:
The intensity of feelings evoked among the justices became obvious
in the hushed chamber of the court after Justice Byron R. White briefly
summarized the 15-page opinion he wrote for the majority.
Normally, that would have ended the matter. In recent years,
dissenters only infrequently have given opinions from the bench.
Yesterday, however, Justice Potter Stewart read aloud most of his
five-page dissent, in which he was joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall
and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, one of the majority, was at
Stewart's right as the dissenter spoke in a strong, controlled voice. As
one cutting phrase tumbled on another, Burger's face reddened. Other
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directed his dissent to Linda Sparkman's preclusion from having her
rights vindicated elsewhere in the legal process.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In addressing the question of Judge Stump's subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court ruled that since "'some of the most difficult
and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to
consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction . . .,' the scope of

the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is
the immunity of the judge. '6 8 The Court reiterated the Bradley
principle that a judge loses his immunity only when he has acted in
the clear absence of all jurisdiction.6 9 Turning to the Indiana Code,
the Court noted that the code gave Judge Stump, as a circuit judge, a
broad jurisdictional grant over all original cases at law and equity
and in "'all other causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive
jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon some other court,
board or officer.'" ' 70

The Court found that neither Indiana case law nor statute
provided Judge Stump with express authority to act as he did. 71 The
only statutes pertaining to sterilization were those that authorized
the sterilization of institutionalized persons under limited circumstances. 72 While the majority only mentioned these statutes in
passing, both Justice Stewart and the court of appeals emphasized
that these statutes only permitted sterilization after an administrative proceeding, which gave the alleged incompetent the right to
notice of the proceeding, the opportunity to defend (including a right
73
to a guardian ad litem), and the right of review in a circuit court.

The court of appeals reasoned that "[t]his statutory scheme clearly
negates jurisdiction to consider sterilization in cases not involving
institutionalized persons and in which these procedures are not
7
followed." 4
justices also appeared to be uncomfortable. The tension struck observers
as almost palpable.

The Washington Post, March 29, 1978, at Al, col. 1.
68. 98 S. Ct. at 1105 (quoting from Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 352
(1872)). See generally Rothschild, Judicial Immunity For Acts Without Jurisdic-

tion, 7 FORDHAM L. REv. 62 (1938).
69. 98 S. Ct. at 1105.

70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. See IND. CODE §§ 16-13-13-1 through 16-13-13-4 (1973).
73. 98 S. Ct. at 1109-10 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 552 F.2d at 175. These statutes were
repealed by the Indiana Legislature in 1974. 98 S. Ct. at 1110 n.4 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).

74. 552 F.2d at 175. See Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio
1971), motion den., 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Guardianship of Kemp, 43
Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974). But see Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp.
361 (D. Conn. 1978) (Connecticut statute providing a method for obtaining

permission for sterilization of mentally retarded inmates of certain state
institutions violates the equal protection clause because it denies parents of
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The Supreme Court disagreed. In a curious analysis of subject
matter jurisdiction, the Stump majority considered it "more
significant" 75 that at the time of Judge Stump's action neither case
nor statutory law in Indiana expressly prohibited Judge Stump from
entertaining the sterilization petition. The Court also relied on
another Indiana statute, 76 which gave parents the right to consent to
medical treatment of their children, in concluding that Indiana law
did not foreclose Judge Stump from approving the sterilization
petition. 77 In keeping with its promise to broadly construe the
jurisdiction of a judge when his immunity is at stake, 78 the Court
employed tenuous reasoning in implying jurisdiction for Judge
Stump's actions.
Speaking for the majority, Justice White addressed the court of
appeals' assertion that jurisdiction for Judge Stump to approve the
petition could not be found in the common law of Indiana. 79 The
court of appeals relied on A.L. v. G.R.H.,0 an Indiana Court of
Appeals decision that affirmed a trial court's denial of a request for a
declaratory judgment by a mother seeking to have her son sterilized.
The Supreme Court responded: "The opinion, however, speaks only
of the rights of parents to consent to the sterilization of their child
and does not question the jurisdiction of a circuit judge who is
presented with such a petition from a parent." 81 The Court ignored
the court of appeals' observation that the cases cited by the A.L.
court were cited for the proposition that a judge in the absence of
express statutory authority lacked jurisdiction to authorize the
sterilization of a minor.8 2 The Supreme Court's failure to consider
this point is puzzling.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

mentally retarded children not inmates a method to obtain permission to have
their children sterilized); Matter of S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 145 (Del. Ch. 1977) ("I
disagree with the reasoning of the Circuit Court [of Appeals in Sparkman v.
McFarlin]because I believe a Legislature neither claims nor has such sophistication.").
98 S. Ct. at 1105.
Id. See IND. CODE § 16-8-4-2 (1973). This statute simply states: "Any person who
is the parent of a child shall be competent to give consent to and contract for
medical or hospital care or treatment of such child, including surgery."
98 S. Ct. at 1105-06. See also Harley v. Oliver, 539 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1976);
Staelens v. Yake, 432 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (in both cases, judges were held
immune from § 1983 suits when they consented to medical treatment of a child
over the religious objections of the parent(s)); Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1118 (1973).
See text accompanying note 68 supra.
552 F.2d at 175.
325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
98 S. Ct. at 1106 (emphasis in original). In a footnote, Justice Stewart termed the
majority's criteria for subject matter jurisdiction as "dangerously broad." Id. at
1110 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
552 F.2d at 175. The A.L. court stated:
We believe the common law does not invest parents with such power
[to have their children sterilized] over their children even though they
sincerely believe the child's adulthood would benefit therefrom. This
result has been reached most recently in In Interest of M.K.R. (1974), 515
S.W.2d 467, and In Re Kemp's Estate (1974), 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 64, where the courts of Missouri and California held that their
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B. Effect of Procedural Flaws on Judicial Immunity
The Stump majority then examined the court of appeals' ruling
that Judge Stump also forfeited his immunity as a result "of his
failure to comply with elementary principles of procedural due
process. 8 3 The court of appeals had severely criticized Judge Stump
for failing to protect Linda Sparkman's rights. It asserted that to
allow such misfeasance by a judge "would be sanctioning tyranny
from the bench. ' '8 4 The Supreme Court, however, chastised the court
of appeals for allegedly misconceiving the doctrine of judicial
immunity, holding: "A judge is absolutely immune from liability for

his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the
commission of grave procedural errors."8 5
In holding that Judge Stump's utter failure to safeguard Linda
Sparkman's constitutional rights did not strip him of his immunity,
the Court merely relied on dictum from Bradley.86 The Court failed to
consider the important constitutional issue of whether Linda
Sparkman's fundamental right of procreation8 was unconstitutionally abrogated by Judge Stump's actions. Lower courts which have
considered the question of whether such a right can be preempted
have held that the "awesome power of denying that right"8 8 may not

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.

respective juvenile statutes making general provision for the welfare of
the children were insufficient to confer jurisdiction to authorize the
sterilization of retarded girls in the absence of specific sterilization
legislation. See, also, Wade v. Bethesda (S.D. Ohio 1973), 356 F. Supp.
380; Frazier v. Levi (1969), Tex. Civ. App., 440 S.W.2d 393; Holmes v.
Powers (1968), Ky., 439 S.W.2d 579.
325 N.E.2d at 502 (emphasis added). Cf. Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849 (9th
Cir. 1977) (holding judge who participated in a plea bargain leading to the
plaintiffs castration to be immune from § 1983 suit only if he had specific
statutory or common law authority to authorize castration in the particular
situation). But cf. Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that
even if plaintiff was committed under a repealed statute providing for summary
commitments, such judicial miscue did not remove shield of judicial immunity).
552 F.2d at 176.
Id.
98 S. Ct. at 1106.
See id.
Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). This right extends to minors as well as to adults. Carey,
supra at 693. See also Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
74-75 (1976). For an enlightening history of sterilization in America, see the
Amicus Curiae Brief in Stump of the National Center for Law and the
Handicapped, Inc. at 7-14.
In Interest of M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470-71 (Mo. 1974). Accord, Frazier v. Levi,
440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). Every state sterilization statute provides
some safeguards to insure that the alleged defective's interests are protected. See,
e.g., North Carolina Association For Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F.
.Supp._451 tNDNS.. 19761. See generally R. Burgdorf and M.P. Burgdorf, The
Wicked Witch Is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell And The Sterilization Of
Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995 (1977); Gauvey and Shuger, The
Permissibility of Involuntary Sterilization under the Parens Patriae and Police
Power Authority of the State, 6 MD. L. FORUM 109 (1976); MURDOCK, Sterilization
of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 917 (1974).
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be used absent sufficient legal safeguards. The Supreme Court chose
not to reach that issue in Stump. Instead, it shrouded Judge Stump
in a sweeping cloak of judicial immunity. The Court's failure to
reach this issue is disturbing. It raises the spectre of a judge acting
summarily to deny persons their constitutional rights while
foreclosing their ability to redress the judge's actions.8 9
C. JudicialAct
The Supreme Court next considered the issue of whether Judge
Stump's act was a judicial act. The Court agreed with the
Sparkmans' contention that judicial immunity attaches only to acts
performed in a judge's judicial capacity, 9° establishing two factors to
determine whether an act by a judge is a judicial one. The first factor
"relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge." 91 The second factor concerns "the
expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in
his judicial capacity. ' 92 The Court concluded that both factors
supported Judge Stump's contention that his approval of the
sterilization petition was a judicial act.
The Court first explained that state judges with general
jurisdiction often consider petitions which concern the affairs of
minors. 93 It then reasoned that Mrs. McFarlin presented the petition
to Judge Stump in his capacity as a circuit court judge, 94 adding that
the informality of a judicial proceeding does not prevent an act from
being a judicial one. 95 This, the Court held, was sufficient to
establish Judge Stump's
act as a judicial act, thereby entitling him
96
to absolute immunity.
It was on this point that Justice Stewart, in his dissent,
launched his attack on the majority opinion. While acknowledging
the doctrine of judicial immunity, he vigorously asserted "that what
89. Judge Stump's failure to notify Linda Sparkman prior to or after his approval of
the sterilization petition, as well as his failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent her interests, obviously precluded her from safeguarding her own
interests as well as from appealing the judge's decision. See generally Levin,
Guardian Ad Litem In A Family Court, 34 MD. L. REV. 341 (1974). At the very
least, Judge Stump violated Canon 3A(4) of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(ABA 1972), which provides: "A judge should accord to every person who is
legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

to law."
98 S.Ct. at 1106.
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id. at 1108.
Id.

95. See id. at 1107. Cf. In re Summers, 352 U.S. 561 (1945) (lack of formality in court's
consideration of a petitioner's application for admission to the state bar did not
prevent proceeding from being a "judicial proceeding"). Compare Gregory v.
Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974) with McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280
(5th Cir. 1972).

96. 98 S.Ct. at 1108.
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Judge Stump did on July 9, 1971, was beyond the pale of anything
that could sensibly be called a judicial act. ' 97 Justice Stewart
contended that the majority's labelling of Judge Stump's act as a
function normally performed by a judge was "factually untrue." 98 In
equally strong language, Justice Stewart termed the majority's
conclusion that Judge Stump's act was performed in his judicial
capacity as "legally unsound." 99
Justice Stewart aptly noted that while parents are generally
authorized to consent to medical treatment of their children, they
need not normally seek the prior approval of a judge. 1°° Asserting
there was nothing to indicate that any Indiana judge had ever
performed such an act, Justice Stewart urged that the judge's act
was not one normally performed by a judge.10 1
Addressing the majority's assertion that Judge Stump acted in
his judicial capacity in approving the sterilization petition, Justice
Stewart convincingly refuted the majority's strained reasoning. He
argued that while Mrs. McFarlin presented her petition to Judge
Stump because he was a judge, "false illusions as to a judge's power
can hardly convert a judge's response to those illusions into a
judicial act."' 0 2 Furthermore, even if Judge Stump told Mrs.
McFarlin he was acting in his judicial capacity, this would make no
difference:
[T]he conduct of a judge surely does not become a judicial
act merely on his own say-so. A judge is not free, like a loose
cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he
announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity.1 03
Finally, Justice Stewart expressed dissatisfaction with the
majority's definition of a judicial act. He maintained "that the
concept of what is a judicial act must take its content from a
consideration of the factors that support immunity from liability for
the performance of such an act."' 0 4 Adopting the reasons cited in
97. Id. at 1109 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In its Amicus Curiae Brief at 4-5, the

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.

National Center for Law and the Handicapped, Inc. likened the immunity sought
to be extended to Judge Stump to that given judges in Nazi Germany who by
judicial fiat extended their power to order persons sterilized.
98 S. Ct. at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id. Justice Stewart continued: "In short, a judge's approval of a mother's petition
to lock her daughter in the attic would hardly be a judicial act simply because the
mother had submitted her petition to the judge in his official capacity." Id.
Id. (footnote omitted). Accord, Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978). In
Zarcone, the court of appeals upheld a $60,000 punitive damages award in a
§ 1983 suit by a coffee vendor against a judge who, displeased with the cup of
coffee he received, ordered the vendor handcuffed and brought to his chambers
where the judge conducted a "pseudo-official inquisition" and threatened the
vendor.
98 S.Ct. at 1111.
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Pierson v. Ray 10 5 for the retention of absolute judicial immunity,
Justice Stewart pointed out that errors in a normal case could be
corrected on appeal, but that here there was no "case," no litigants,
nor any manner in which to appeal Judge Stump's actions. 10 6 It was
the absence of these characteristics of a normal judicial proceeding,
as well as a lack of "even the pretext of principled decisionmaking,"' 1 7 which convinced Justice Stewart to conclude that Judge
Stump's act was not a judicial one.
In a separate dissent, Justice Powell emphasized Linda
Sparkman's preclusion from other means to protect her rights, due to
the clandestine actions of Judge Stump and his co-defendants. He
contended that the rationale behind judicial immunity was that
private suits against the judiciary could be safely prohibited for the
sake of an independent judiciary as there existed alternative
methods for redress, such as appeal. 08 Finding this rationale absent
in the instant case, as Judge Stump's act foreclosed any appeal or
other remedy, Justice Powell reasoned that the judicial immunity
doctrine was "inoperative.' 0 9 He agreed with Justice Stewart that
Judge Stump's act was nonjudicial and that Judge Stump was not
entitled to immunity from suit under section 1983.110
IV. CRITICISM OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
In recent years, many legal commentators have strongly
criticized the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity."' As noted
earlier, the Supreme Court's assertion of absolute judicial immunity
as being firmly established in early American common law and not
legislatively overruled by section 1983 is open to attack.' 2 There is

105. 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).

[Ilt is ... for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and
without fear of consequences. . . . It is a judge's duty to decide all cases
within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His
errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that
unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or
corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to

principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.
106. 98 S. Ct. at 1111.
107. Id.

108. 98 S. Ct. at 1111 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1112. See the Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Center for Law and the
Handicapped, Inc. at 38-42.
110. 98 S. Ct. at 1112.
111. E.g., Kates, Immunity Of State Judges Under The Federal Civil Rights Acts:
Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615 (1970); Note, Immunity Of
Federal And State Judges From Civil Suit - Time For A Qualified Immunity?,
27 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 727 (1977); Comment, Charity Begins At Home: Judicial
Immunity In Iowa, 58 IOWA L. REV. 197 (1972); Note, Liability of Judicial
Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969).
112. See text accompanying notes 38, 61-63 supra.
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also a frequent lack of consistency in decisions 13 and a dearth of indepth analysis by the judiciary when faced with a case involving
their own immunity as opposed to cases concerning immunity for

other public servants.11 4 The reluctance of judges to closely
scrutinize the actions of their brethren might be best explained by

the old adage: "There, but for the grace of God, go I."
Upon close examination, even the strongest rationales for the
retention of absolute judicial immunity lack firm support. One of
these rationales for the doctrine is that a judge's decision is
appealable or correctable by other judicial means; that litigants
should be required to follow the appellate process for redress."15
Justices Stewart and Powell effectively demonstrated the fallacy of
this rationale in a case such as Stump v.Sparkman" 6 in which no
appeal could be taken or where no other judicial remedy was
available. Moreover, while a judge's decision may be overturned on
appeal, the reversal does nothing to compensate a litigant who has
suffered financial, emotional, and other harm as a result of the
judge's malfeasance. 117 Impeachment of a judge or disciplinary
proceedings against him are not only cumbersome and seldom-used
devices, but are "directed only toward the correction of future

113. Justice White, author of the Stump opinion, demonstrated this inconsistency in
Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978). In Butz he gave the following reasons
for absolute judicial immunity:

At the same time, the safeguards built into the judicial process tend

114.

115.
116.
117.

to reduce the need for private damage actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct. The insulation of the judge from political
influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the
adversary nature of the process, and the correctabilityof erroron appeal
are just a few of the many checks on malicious actions by judges.
Id. at 2914 (emphasis added). The latter three safeguards were conspiciously
absent in Stump, nor did Justice White use this rationale in Stump.
Maryland case law on judicial immunity is a good example of the frequent
failure of state courts to clearly analyze the doctrine of judicial immunity and to
reconcile a present decision with previous cases. Compare Bevard v. Hoffman, 18
Md. 479, 484 (1862) and Hiss v. State, 24 Md. 556, 560-62 (1866) and Knell v.
Briscoe, 49 Md. 414, 416-17 (1878) with State v. Carrick, 70 Md. 586, 588, 17 A.
559, 559 (1889) and Roth v. Shupp, 94 Md. 55, 59-60, 50 A. 430, 431-32 (1901) and
Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356, 196 A.2d 887, 889-90 (1964) (dictum). See also
61 Md. Att'y Gen. Op. 63 (1976) (judicial immunity does not shield District Court
Commissioner from liability for injuries sustained by members of the public
while in the Commissioner's home on official business).
See Note, Immunity Of Federal And State Judges From Civil Suit - Time For A
Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 727, 753 n.158 (1977). The only
legislative analysis by the Supreme Court of the applicability of § 1983 to suits
against judges consisted of one brief paragraph. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554-55 (1967).
Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2914 (1978). See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1872).
98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
Kates, Immunity Of State Judges Under The Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson
v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615, 638-39 (1970).
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irresponsible action"; 118 they do not compensate the victim for the
deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Another major argument for the retention of absolute judicial
immunity is the need for judges to act decisively without fear of suit
by disgruntled litigants. 119 Advocates of absolute judicial immunity
contend that the doctrine is essential to maintain the independence
of the judiciary and to prevent judges from being intimidated by the
threat of civil suits. Yet, as one commentator put it, such arguments
"presume a general weakness in judicial fibre. It does not follow that
principle automatically flees from a fear of law-suits."' 12 Federal and
21
state officials are only accorded a qualified immunity from suit.'
Numerous other professionals such as physicians, attorneys and
police officers also exercise a great deal of discretion with the threat
of lawsuits everpresent. 22 Nevertheless, all of these persons manage
to effectively carry out their responsibilities. In short, it is
inconsonant that the judiciary should hold other professionals and
public officials to negligence and good faith standards of liability
while holding itself absolutely immune. A cynic might be tempted to
agree with a British commentator who remarked about the
sensitivity of British judges to criticism: "Her Majesty's judges, it
would appear, are hothouse plants. Exposed to the frost of public
disapproval, they may wither and die.' 23 No one would disagree
with the need for an independent judiciary, but as Justice Stewart
argued in Stump, in the case of "such lawless conduct as took place
here . . . if intimidation would serve to deter its recurrence, that
1 24
would surely be in the public interest.'

118. Note, Immunity Of Federal And State Judges From Civil Suit - Time For A
Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. Ras. L. REV. 727, 728 (1977). See generally id.
at n.7; Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE
L.J. 1475 (1970); Comment, JudicialDiscipline,Removal, And Retirement, 1976
Wisc. L. REv. 563; 84 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1974).
119. See Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1108 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
120. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 331
(1969).
121. Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
But see Granger v. Marek, 47 U.S.L.W. 2152 (6th Cir. September 12, 1978)
(holding that Butz v. Economou applies only to constitutional deprivations and
not to common law torts).
122. See Brazier, Judicial Immunity and the Independence of the Judiciary, 1976
PUBLIC LAW 397, 408-09; Comment, Charity Begins At Home: JudicialImmunity
In Iowa, 58 IOWA L. REV. 197, 202 (1972)..:.
123. Brazier, Judicial Immunity and the Independence of the Judiciary,1976 PUBLIC
LAW 397, 397. In Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2922 n.* (1978) (Rehnquist J.,
dissenting), Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for granting federal
officials only a qualified immunity from suit while retaining absolute immunity
for the judiciary, citing Stump. He argued that while the majority was mindful of
the pressures on judges, it had forgotten that similar pressures are placed on
many nonjudicial public officials. "[T]he cynical among us might not unreasonably feel that this is simply another unfortunate example of judges treating those
who are not part of the judicial machinery as 'lesser breeds without the lawl,"

Id.
124. 98 S. Ct. at 1111 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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Frivolous or petty suits against judges can be easily disposed of
by summary judgment' 2 5 or judgment on the pleadings. 126 A
requirement that a plaintiff first pursue the appellate process, where
appeal is possible, and be successful in winning a reversal of the
127
original decision would help to eliminate many frivolous suits.
Despite the fact that such suits would cause some judges inconvenience, to allow considerations of convenience to determine immunity
128
is untenable.

V. PROPOSALS FOR A QUALIFIED JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
In the search for a qualified judicial immunity, commentators
have focused on two standards of liability - negligence and actual
malice. One commentator advocating a negligence standard suggested that liability be based only on "an error so serious that a
judge normally careful of his duties would not have made or an error
'
that could only have resulted from a very serious neglect of duty. "129
A negligence standard of judicial liability has been criticized on two
specific grounds. First, it is argued that it is too difficult to determine
a standard of conduct for judges, and that trials would be bogged

down in matters of proof. 30 The short answer is that juries must
regularly determine whether other professionals have met their
standard of professional conduct in complex areas such as the
medical and legal fields. Why should a jury be any less qualified to
determine judicial malpractice than any other form of professional
wrongdoing? As one commentator noted, the "expert witness" 131 in

each case will be sitting on the bench who can set a standard of
professional conduct based on his own judicial experience. The
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.

126.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

R. Civ. P. 12(c). Cf. Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2911 (1978) (holding
that federal officials are only entitled to a qualified immunity from § 1983 suits)
FED.

where Justice White explained:
Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert
to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a
compensable claim for relief under the Federal Constitution, it should
not survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover,. . . damage suits concerning
constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated
on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the
defense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion, plaintiffs may
not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by
frivolous lawsuits.
See Kates, Immunity Of State Judges Under The Federal Civil Rights Acts:
Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 615, 634-35 (1970).
See Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 331
(1969).
4 OTTAWA L. REV. 627, 634 (1971).
Note, Immunity Of Federal And State Judges From Civil Suit - Time For A
Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 767 (1977); Note, Liability of
Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 335 (1969).
4 OTTAWA L. REV. 627, 634 (1971). In the case of a nonjury trial, a fellow judge
should not experience great difficulty in following the testimony.
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stronger argument against a negligence standard is that judges
would be subject to more frivolous suits as the burden of proof is
judgment is more difficult to obtain in
lower and summary
132
negligence cases.
An actual malice standard would eliminate the borderline and
frivolous suits while redressing the blatantly erroneous actions of a
judge in such cases as Stump v. Sparkman.133 As "[a]pplied to a
judicial officer, this would mean that an action would be malicious if
it was done with actual knowledge that it was incorrect or with
reckless disregard of whether it was correct or not."'134 The focus of
the trial would not be on whether a judge erred in his rulings, but
1 35
whether the judge maliciously deprived a litigant of his rights.
The plaintiff would bear a heavy burden of proof, and the actual
malice standard would not punish those judges who make good faith
or honest errors of judgment. 3 6 Such a standard would serve to
compensate those who have been the clear object of judicial abuse
while protecting the judiciary from petty suits.
Applying the actual malice standard to Stump, it is clear that
Judge Stump acted with reckless disregard in approving the
sterilization petition. First, there was no common law or statutory
authority in Indiana or anywhere else in the country that sanctioned
a judge approving the sterilization of a minor simply on the basis of
an ex parte petition. 137 Second, Judge Stump's failure to set a
hearing on the matter and appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
Linda Sparkman demonstrated the judge's utter lack of interest in
determining whether he had such authority. The third and most
damning aspect of Judge Stump's actions, however, was his failure
to ascertain the truth of Mrs. McFarlin's allegations before
authorizing such drastic and irreversible surgery. In sum, Judge

132. See note 130 supra.

133. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
134. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 322 n.3

(1969). This commentator, the first to suggest an actual malice standard for
judicial wrongdoing, derived the standard analogously from the actual malice
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). The Court held that a public official could recover damages in a
defamation suit against a newspaper only if he showed the newspaper to have
printed the allegedly defamatory material "with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280. See also Kates,
Immunity Of State Judges Under The Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray

Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 615, 624 (1970); Note, Immunity Of Federal And
State Judges From Civil Suit RES. L. REV. 727, 767 (1977).

Time For A Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W.

135. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 336-37
(1969).
136. "[T]he malice standard places no strain on the independence of the conscientious
judge who decides close cases against the party arguing a deprivation of
constitutional rights. The only pressure involved is exerted against the free rein
to prejudice and abuse of judicial power." Id.
137. See note 88 supra.
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Stump acted with reckless disregard as to the correctness of his
actions.
It should now be apparent that the doctrine of judicial immunity
is firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence. Even Justice
Stewart in his strong dissent in Stump agreed with the doctrine of
judicial immunity as pronounced in Bradley v. Fisher,138 and also
concurred with Judge Stump's assertion that "an aura of deism
surrounds the bench [which is] essential to the maintenance of
respect for the judicial institution."' 139 Any change in the doctrine of
judicial immunity will certainly not come from the judiciary in the
foreseeable future. Such reform must be forthcoming from state
legislatures and the Congress. On the federal level, section 1983 and
the Federal Tort Claims Act 140 could be amended
to specifically
14
permit actions against state and federal judges. '
There is also the question of who will pay the damages award in
a judicial malpractice case. Unless the state has waived its tort
42
immunity, a plaintiff would be barred by the eleventh amendment
from imposing liability on the state. 143 A plaintiff would then have
to seek to impose personal liability on the offending judge. Should
the state elect to pay such damages, the state would also be more
interested in selecting and disciplining judges whose actions would
138. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
139. 98 S.Ct. at 1111 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart commented: "Though
the rhetoric may be overblown, I do not quarrel with it." Id.
140. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976).
141. But cf. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 588-89 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1021 (1967). The Bauers court contended that legislative abrogation of the
doctrine of judicial immunity would violate the guarantee clause (article 4, § 4) of
the federal constitution, which guarantees a republican form of government, by
destroying the independence of the judiciary. The court conceded, however, that
Congress probably had the authority to abrogate judicial immunity since
enforcement of the clause was the province of Congress as it involved a
nonjusticiable "politicalquestion." Id. at 589.
For a good discussion of potential causes of action for judicial wrongdoing,
see Note, Immunity Of FederalAnd State Judges From Civil Suit - Time For A
Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 727, 758-66 (1977).
142. U.S. CONST.amend. XI. The eleventh amendment states: 'The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
143. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See generally Field, The Eleventh
Amendment And Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition Of Suit Upon The States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203 (1978); Field, The Eleventh
Amendment And Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: PartOne, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 515 (1978). See also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
While the eleventh amendment does not apply to suits against the federal
government (for example, suits involving the actions of federal judges), the
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred suits against the federal government until
the partial abrogation of the government's tort immunity in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976). The judicial decisions of federal
judges, however, are not within the scope of the Act. Foster v. McBride, 521 F.2d
1304 (9th Cir. 1975); Cromelin v. United States, 177 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 944 (1950). But cf. United States v. LePatourel, 571 F.2d 405 (8th
Cir. 1978) (see note 60 supra).
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subject it to financial liability. Should the state elect not to waive its
immunity, judges would be more circumspect about disregarding the
rights of litigants.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the doctrine of
judicial immunity in Stump v. Sparkman14 4 means that any person
who wishes to challenge the immunity of a judge will have to storm
an almost impregnable citadel. To paraphrase Justice Stewart, the
Court has licensed judges to inflict indiscriminate damage like loose
cannons 145 without fear of personal liability. The Court has made a
policy decision to allow the injuries which some persons will
inevitably incur at the hands of some unscrupulous judges to go
unremedied in order to allow all judges to make hard decisions free
from personal considerations. 146 It is respectfully submitted, however, that the Supreme Court's sweeping interpretation of the
breadth of judicial immunity serves more to further the doctrine as a
sword for the malicious than as a shield for the conscientious.
John Bennett Sinclair

144. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
145. See id. at 1110 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
146. Accord, United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926, 934 (S.D. Cal. 1944) ("The
house should not be burned to destroy the mouse.").

APPENDIX
STATE OF INDIANA
COUNTY OF DEKALB)

SS:

PETITION TO HAVE TUBAL LIGATION PERFORMED ON
MINOR AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
Ora Spitler McFarlin, being duly sworn upon her oath states
that she is the natural mother of and has custody of her daughter,
Linda Spitler, age fifteen (15) being born January 24, 1956 and said
daughter resides with her at 108 Iwo Street, Auburn, DeKalb County,
Indiana.
Affiant states that her daughter's mentality is such that she is
considered to be somewhat retarded although she is attending or has
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attended the public schools in DeKalb Central School System and
has been passed along with other children in her age level even
though she does not have what is considered normal mental
capabilities and intelligence. Further, that said affiant has had
problems in the home of said child as a result of said daughter
leaving the home on several occasions to associate with older youth
or young men and as a matter of fact having stayed overnight with
said youth or men and about which incidents said affiant did not
become aware until after such incidents occurred. As a result of this
behavior and the mental capabilities of said daughter, affiant
believes that it is to the best interest of said child that a Tubal
Ligation be performed on said minor daughter to prevent unfortunate circumstances to occur and since it is impossible for the
affiant as mother of said minor child to maintain and control a
continuous observation of the activities of said daughter each and
every day.
Said affiant does hereby in consideration of the Court of the
DeKalb Circuit Court approving the Tubal Ligation being performed
upon her minor daughter does hereby covenant and agree to
indemnify and keep indemnified and hold Dr. John Hines, Auburn,
Indiana, who said affiant is requesting perform said operation and
the DeKalb Memorial Hospital, Auburn, Indiana, whereas said
operation will be performed, harmless from and against all or any
matters or causes of action that could or might arise as a result of
the performing of said Tubal Ligation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said affiant, Ora Spitler McFarlin, has
hereunto subscribed her name this 9th day of July, 1971.
ORA SPITLER MCFARLIN
Ora Spitler McFarlin
Petitioner
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of July, 1971.
/s/

/s/ WARREN G. SUNDAY
Warren G. Sunday
Notary Public
My commission expires January 4, 1975.
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I, Harold D. Stump, Judge of the DeKalb Circuit Court, do
hereby approve the above Petition by affidavit form on behalf of Ora
Spitler McFarlin, to have Tubal Ligation performed upon her minor
daughter, Linda Spitler, subject to said Ora Spitler McFarlin
covenanting and agreeing to indemnify and keep indemnified Dr.
John Hines and the DeKalb Memorial Hospital from any matters or
causes of action arising therefrom.
/s/ HAROLD D. STUMP
Judge, DeKalb Circuit Court
Dated July 9, 1971

